The software architecture of a distributed program can be represented by a hierarchical composition of subsystems, with interacting processes at the leaves of the hierarchy. Compositional reachability analysis (CRA) is a promising state reduction technique which can be automated and used in stages to derive the overall behavior of a distributed program based on its architecture. CRA is particularly suitable for the analysis of programs that are subject to evolutionary change. When a program evolves, only the behaviors of those subsystems affected by the change need be reevaluated. The technique however has a limitation. The properties available for analysis are constrained by the set of actions that remain globally observable. Properties involving actions encapsulated by subsystems may therefore not be analyzed. In this article, we enhance the CRA technique to check safety properties which may contain actions that are not globally observable. To achieve this, the state machine model is augmented with a special trap state labeled as . We propose a scheme to transform, in stages, a property that involves hidden actions to one that involves only globally observable actions. The enhanced technique also includes a mechanism aiming at reducing the debugging effort. The technique is illustrated using a gas station system example.
INTRODUCTION

Background
Distributed processing is used to provide computing support for many diverse applications. Many of these applications are complex and critical; an error can have catastrophic consequences. Behavior analysis is one of the techniques that can help to discover defects and check if a program performs as intended. However, concurrent and distributed programs are generally more complex to analyze than their sequential counterparts. Even for small programs, analysis of their behavior is impractical without the support of an effective automated technique.
Static analysis techniques for concurrent and distributed programs can be used to verify two classes of property: safety and liveness [Alpern and Schneider 1985; Corbett and Avrunin 1995; Manna and Pnueli 1995] . A safety asserts that the program never enters an undesirable state. For example, mutual exclusion is a safety property that specifies the absence of a program state where a common resource is simultaneously accessed by more than one client. A liveness property asserts that a program eventually enters a desirable state. For example, freedom from starvation is a liveness property; it says that a program state, where some request is served, will finally be entered.
In this article, we focus our discussion on the provision of an effective technique for checking safety properties that characterize undesirable execution sequences of a program. These safety properties can be specified in the form of regular expressions or deterministic finite-state machines [Dwyer and Clarke 1994; Olender and Osterweil 1990] . The two formalisms are interchangeable. For the ease of understanding, we use the formalism of state machines. State machines that specify safety properties are called property automata. Each property automaton specifies the set of feasible execution sequences over the actions (transitions) that correspond to a safety property of interest. For example, the property automaton in Figure  1 asserts that (1) no execution of action update can occur unless preceded by an execution of action lock and (2) every lock action is succeeded by an update and an unlock action.
The software architecture of a distributed program can be represented by a hierarchical composition of subsystems, with interacting (primitive) processes at the leaves of the hierarchy. Behavior of a primitive process can be modeled similarly, as a state machine whose transitions are labeled by the activities it can perform. In this article, we assume that the behavior of each primitive process can be expressed in a finite-state deterministic machine. Composite processes appear at the intermediate nodes of the hierarchy. Each composite process is a subsystem formed by a collection of processes; these processes can be either primitive or composite.
Static analysis is an approach to program behavior verification without execution. The approach is particularly useful in identifying program design errors prior to implementation. Various static analysis techniques have been proposed for checking properties of distributed programs. These include techniques such as symbolic model checking [McMillan 1993 ], inequality-necessary conditions analysis [Avrunin et al. 1991; Corbett and Avrunin 1995] , data flow analysis [Cheung and Kramer 1994; Dwyer and Clarke 1994; Masticola and Ryder 1991] and explicit state enumeration [Cheung and Kramer 1996b; Godefroid and Wolper 1991; Holzmann 1991; Long and Clarke 1989; Taylor 1983; Valmari et al. 1993] . A number of recent studies have applied static analysis techniques to verify various types of concurrent applications [Anderson et al. 1996; Corbett 1996; Dwyer et al. 1997; Holzmann 1997; Juval 1998; Mascarenhas et al. 1998; Naumovich et al. 1997; Young et al. 1995] .
Symbolic model checking has been widely used to verify designs of digital circuits against properties expressed in branching-time temporal logic CTL. The state space is represented symbolically by a logical formula captured using a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD). The technique works well for hardware designs with regular logical structures. For such systems, BDD representations can reduce the state space from exponential order of the number of state variables to linear. However, it is less likely to achieve similar reductions in software specifications whose logical structures are less regular. Techniques using explicit state enumeration were found to be more effective than that using BDD representation in the verification of a safety injection component of a naval system [Bharadwaj and Heitmeyer 1997] . This is because a BDD represents all possible states while explicit state enumeration techniques consider only reachable states. Attempts are being made to adapt symbolic model checking for software systems [Anderson et al. 1996 ]. In the inequality-necessary conditions analysis [Avrunin et al. 1991; Corbett and Avrunin 1995] , the necessary conditions for the existence of an execution trace that violates a specified property are expressed using a set of inequalities. These inequalities are then solved using standard integer linear programming packages. Nonexistence of solutions guarantees the satisfiability of the property while existence of solutions yields an inconclusive result. The technique has the advantage that the number of inequalities is essentially linear to the number of concurrent processes in a program. However, integer linear programming problems are generally NP-hard, and the standard techniques involved are potentially exponential. Data flow analysis techniques adopt a different approach. By approximating the execution model of a program, properties 
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• can be efficiently checked using a polynomial algorithm. However the conclusion thus obtained is usually either complete or sound but not both [Cheung and Kramer 1994; Dwyer and Clarke 1994; Masticola and Ryder 1991; Reif and Smolka 1990] .
Analysis using explicit state enumeration is conducted by constructing an equivalent state machine of the program against which properties can be checked. It is generally known as reachability analysis. A major problem of reachability analysis is that the search space involved can expand exponentially with the increase in the number of concurrent processes. Reduction techniques have been proposed to alleviate the problem by not having to construct the entire state graph. Reduction techniques can be broadly classified into two categories: reduction by partial ordering and reduction by compositional minimization. In the former category, reduction is achieved by avoiding the generation of all paths formed by the interleaving of the same set of transitions [Godefroid and Wolper 1991; Holzmann et al. 1992; Valmari 1991] . In the latter category, reduction is achieved by intermediate minimization of subsystems [Malhotra et al. 1988; Sabnani et al. 1989; Tai and Koppol 1993a; 1993b; Yeh and Young 1991] . Reduction techniques in this category are known as compositional reachability analysis (CRA). We adopt this latter approach, as it is effective, amenable to automation, and closely matches the software architecture (structure) of the program design.
Related Work of Compositional Reachability Analysis
Compositional reachability analysis (CRA) techniques were originally proposed to remedy the problem of traditional reachability analysis techniques [Peterson 1981; Pezzè et al. 1995; Taylor 1983 ] which compose the global system representation in a single step. Yeh [1993] described several case studies which suggested similar performance between a technique of compositional reachability analysis and that of constrained expressions [Avrunin et al. 1991] . Sabnani et al. [1989] described an experiment applying compositional reachability analysis to the Q.931 protocol. They found that the intermediate state space graphs generated never exceeded 1,000 states although the global state space graph given by traditional reachability analysis of the protocol contained over 60,000 states. A similar observation has also been made by Giannakopoulou et al. [1999] in the case study of a reliable multicast transport protocol that contains over 96,000 states and 672,000 transitions. The intermediate state space graphs generated by the CRA never exceeded 400 states. Furthermore, CRA techniques are particularly suitable to analyze programs that are likely to evolve. The techniques help localize the effect of change. When changes are applied to a program, only the state machines of those subsystems that are affected by the changes need be recomputed.
Although CRA techniques have advantages over traditional techniques of reachability analysis, the system representation generated cannot be utilized to validate behavioral properties involving actions that are not globally observable. Verification has to be restricted to only those properties formed by globally observable actions. However, a complex program typically involves many sophisticated interactions between multiple subsystems. These subsystems can be independently developed or extracted from software libraries. Each assumes a set of predefined communicating protocols at its interface. For a subsystem to function properly, its neighbors must respect its protocols. These protocols can therefore be conceived as the subsystem properties that have to be satisfied in the composite system. Checking the satisfaction of all these properties in the global context may therefore lead to the need to expose many or all subsystem interactions even though many of them may be irrelevant to the abstract view of the system. This contradicts the key philosophy of abstraction and jeopardizes the effectiveness of CRA techniques when applied to complex programs.
In this article, we enhance the CRA technique with a mechanism to validate safety properties without the need for making the involved actions globally observable. These properties are violated when some subsystems, within the context of a distributed application, can perform execution sequences not acceptable to the specified property automata. If no violation of safety properties is detected, the analysis constructs a global labeled transition system observationally equivalent [Milner 1989 ] to that constructed using conventional CRA techniques; otherwise it indicates which safety properties are violated and how the violations can occur. We have found no similar work providing this feature in the framework of CRA.
The proposed mechanism is complementary to state space reduction techniques for CRA [Cheung and Kramer 1996b; Graf and Steffen 1990] . Cheung proposed a method to alleviate state explosion encountered in CRA by using context constraints automatically derived from the environment of each subsystem. The output delivered by the method is a state machine representing the global behavior of the program being analyzed. However, developers generally wish to validate desirable program properties in addition to the generation of a global state machine. To check safety properties using the mechanisms of CRA, we add a special trap state to the state machine model. The trap state, labeled as , identifies undesirable execution sequences of a program. The use of trap states for checking behavioral properties has been proposed in some data flow analysis techniques, such as CECIL [Olender and Osterweil 1990] and FLAVERS [Dwyer and Clarke 1994] , but these techniques do not make use of the given design hierarchy. Trap states can also be utilized to detect erroneous program behavior constraints specified by users [Cheung and Kramer 1995] .
Article's Outline
In the next section, we introduce labeled transition systems and present a gas station system, which is used as an in our discussions. Section 3 presents a technique to detect and locate violation of safety properties in Compositional Reachability Analysis • the framework of CRA, illustrating experience of its use on the example. Section 4 gives an account of a mechanism which reduces the effort of debugging in the compositional framework. This is followed by performance evaluation and conclusions in Sections 5 and 6, respectively.
BACKGROUND
Labeled Transition Systems
A labeled transition system (LTS) can be used to model the behavior of processes in a distributed program. An LTS contains all the states that the process may reach and all the transitions that it may perform. For instance, Figure 2 represents an LTS describing a writer that repeatedly updates information in a shared resource. The Writer must first go from state 0 to 1 to lock the shared resource. Unlocking the resource results in the transition back to state 0.
Actions performed by a program are given the same label if there is no need to distinguish them from one another. The set of actions relevant for a particular behavioral description of a process P is called its alphabet [Hoare 1985 ], denoted as ␣P. In the above example, the alphabet of Writer equals {lock, unlock, update}. The alphabet is a permanent predefined property of a process. Logically, a process may only perform actions belonging to its alphabet. For example, Writer cannot perform an action read which is outside its alphabet. However, a process might never perform an action in its alphabet. An alphabet is so chosen as to make analysis tractable. This involves decisions to ignore many other propeties and actions considered to be of lesser interest. A process may perform some activities which cannot be influenced by its environment. These activites are labeled by an internal action which is represented by the symbol . The presented LTS computational model has been widely used in the literature for specifying and analysing distributed program Ghezzi et al. 1991, chapter 6; Kemppainen et al. 1992; Rabinovich 1992; . Formally, an LTS of a process P is a quadruple ͗S, A, ⌬, q͘, where (1) S is a set of states;
(2) A ϭ ␣P ഫ ͕͖, where ␣P is communication alphabet of P which does not contain the internal action Since there is a one-to-one mapping between a process P and its LTS, the term process and LTS are used interchangeably. The above statement may also be rewritten as
The trap state is introduced as an error state at which specified safety properties are violated. A process that is trapped at the state can participate in no further actions. Its behavior is represented by an LTS͕͖͗, ⌺, A, ͘, where ⌺ represents the universal set of actions. For convenience, we use ⌸ to denote a trapped process. Thus a process P ϭ ͗S, A, ⌬, q͘ transits into ⌸ if it executes a transition ͑q, a, ͒ in ⌬. For instance, Figure 3 represents a writer that transits into ⌸ after executing update at state 0. Hence, Writer O ¡ update ⌸. Behavior of a process can be observed by means of its execution traces. An execution trace of a process is a sequence of actions that it can perform. For example, the sequence ͗lock, update, unlock͘ is a trace of Writer in Figures 2 and 3. The set of possible traces of a process P is denoted by tr͑P͒, whose formal definition can be found in the work of Hoare [1985] . A trace is said to be trapping if its execution leads a process to ⌸; otherwise it is nontrapping. A process is said to be trappable if it contains some trapping traces; otherwise it is nontrappable.
Observability of actions in a process can be controlled by a restriction operator "1". P1L represents the process projected from P in which only the actions in set L are observable. The restriction operator ensures that P has trapping traces if and only if P1L has. Rules (1) and (2) in Figure 4 give the transitional semantics of the restriction operator. Processes in a distributed program may also be composed by a composition operator ʈ similar to that used in CSP [Hoare 1985] . PʈQ is the parallel Compositional Reachability Analysis
• composition of processes P and Q with synchronization of the actions common to both of their alphabets and interleaving of the others. The alphabet of PʈQ is given by the union of their individual alphabets (i.e., ␣P ഫ ␣Q).
Rules (3), (4), and (5) in Figure 4 give the transitional semantics of the composition operator. The operator is both commutative and associative. Given two processes A and B behaving as described in Figure 5 (a), we can construct a composite process. AʈB behaves as Figure 5 (b) by applying the rules. Here, the alphabet of A and B is ͕a, b, c͖, respectively. States in the composite process are given in tuples where the first and second fields refer to the state in processes A and B, respectively. The rules also require that a composite process be trapped at state if any of its constituent processes is trapped. For simplicity, states in a composite process will be given in tuples only if explanation requires relating them to the states in the constituent processes; otherwise they will be simply labeled using integers. 
• 2.2 Behavioral Equivalences
Informally, the notion of observation on a process is postulated to describe the process behavior perceivable by an observer performing experiments on the process. Behavior equivalence is a concept to identify a pair of processes which cannot be distinguished by such observations. Two processes are said to be in weak equivalence (denoted as Ϸ) when their observable behaviors are indistinguishable. When the behaviors of these two processes are indistinguishable even when taking into account their unobservable behaviors, they are said to be in strong equivalence (denoted as ‫.)ف‬ Naturally, strong equivalence is a subset of weak equivalence. Comprehensive treatment of strong and weak equivalences can be found in the work of Milner et al. [1989] . Formally, let ဧ and ⌺ be the universal set of processes and that of actions including , respectively. Formally, strong equivalence ‫ف‬ is the union of all relations R ʕ ဧ ϫ ဧ satisfying that ͑P, Q͒ ʦ R satisfying that ͑P, Q͒ ʦ R implies (1) ␣P ϭ ␣Q;
(2) for all a ʦ ⌺:
The key mechanism of compositional reachability analysis is to minimize the number of states of a composite process after action restriction. The minimization respects the weak equivalence. A minimization algorithm respecting the weak equivalence can be found in Holzmann [1991] and Paige and Tarjan [1987] . To facilitate our discussion, let us denote PaL to be the minimized process derived from P1L.
Assumptions
In the discussion of compositional reachability analysis, we assume that each subsystem hides at its boundary only those internal actions that neither participate in further interprocess communications nor are globally observable. Suppose a program contains primitive processes P 1 , . . . , P n . Under this assumption, the global state machine constructed by CRA is ͑P 1 ʈ. . . ʈP n ͒aL, where L is the set of actions that appear in the global state machine. Safety properties are concerned with the absence of unde-sirable states in a program. In this article, we confine the state space of a program to the cartesian product of LTSes. We argue that safety properties can be adequately expressed using finite-state automata if all primitive processes can be expressed as finite-state deterministic machines. The state space formed by the cartesian product of these primitive processes is both finite and deterministic. As such, all undesirable states are uniquely identified by distinct traces that can be expressed using regular expressions and hence finite-state automata.
A Gas Station Example
As an illustration for our discussion, we present a gas station example ( Figure 6 ) originally proposed by Helmbold and Luckham [1985] . The example models an automated gas station with an operator, a pump, two customers, and a queue holding customers' requests.
2 The design architecture in Figure 7 describes the subsystem structure, constituent processes, and interactions for the gas station system. It is specified in an Architecture Description Language (ADL), called Darwin [Magee et al. 1995] , 3 which has a graphical representation as shown in the figure. Interaction between processes is achieved by communication on bindings between matching pairs of service requirements (white dots) and provisions (black dots). Subsystems are introduced to encapsualte internal substructure and interaction. The approach is designed to support modular and comprehensible 2 The example can be extended to accommodate more operators, customers, and pumps. 3 Darwin supports the definition of parameterized component types and generic architectures. For analysis and program construction, a generic architecture must be instantiated, evaluating the parameters, elaborating the component definitions, and performing interface bindings to generate a particular architectural instance. This can be analyzed or implemented in Regis [Magee et al. 1995 ], a distributed programming environment which supports Darwin design specifications. For simplicity, we neglect many of the naming and elaboration issues. 
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• S. C. Cheung and J. Kramer system design. Decomposition of subsystems terminates at the primitive processes that are represented as shaded rectangles. For analysis, behaviors of primitive processes that are represented as shaded rectangles. For analysis, behaviors of primitive processes are given as LTSes; for implementation, primitive processes are realized in some programming language, such as Cϩϩ.
The design architecture of the gas station postulates a hierarchy of subsystems as shown in Figure 8 . The set of actions exported by a subsystem for interaction is annotated using the restriction operator 1. In the hierarchy, a subsystem is a composite process (represented as a box with rounded corners) formed by the parallel composition of its descendent processes, which in turn can either be subsystems or primitive processes (represented as rectangles). For instance, the design architecture specifies that subsystem Counter is composed of processes charge1, charge2, prepay1, prepay2, change1, change2} and Station ϭ ͑CounterʈOperator͒a͕start1, start2, finish1, finish2, prepay1, prepay2, change1, change2} . 
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• As mentioned, hiding internal interactions helps make the design and analysis more comprehensible. In the following discussion, let us assume that the software developers want to know if customers can be served in any order, and hence study the system behavior with respect to actions prepay1 and prepay2. In other words, only these two actions are retained as observable in the global LTS of GasStation:
GasStation ϭ ͑StationʈClients͒a͕prepay1, prepay2͖
ENHANCED COMPOSITIONAL REACHABILITY ANALYSIS
Limitations of Compositional Reachability Analysis
As mentioned, compositional derivation of the overall system behavior has been shown to be a very promising approach for reachability analysis [Sabnani et al. 1989; Tai and Koppol 1993a; Yeh and Young 1991] . In such compositional reachability analysis (CRA) techniques, the model of the target system is given as an LTS that describes the overall system behavior. Given a subsystem hierarchy, the LTS of a system is composed step by step from those of its subsystems in a bottom-up manner. In each intermediate step, the LTS of a subsystem is minimized by hiding all internal actions. For instance, the LTS of GasStation in Figure 8 can be composed in four steps. First, compose the LTS of Counter from Operator and Queue. Second, compose the resultant LTS of Counter with Pump to generate the LTS of Station. Third, construct the LTS of Clients from Cust1 and Cust2. Finally, compose the LTS of GasStation from that of Station and that of Clients. This mechanism of "intermediate minimization during composition" is attractive for the analysis of modular systems. Figure 11 shows that there is no particular ordering relation betweeen the ocurrences of prepay1 and prepay2.
The key to the success of CRA techniques is to employ a modular software architecture and hide as many internal actions as possible in each subsystem. A subsystem containing fewer observable actions can generally be represented by a simpler LTS. However, the properties that are then available for reasoning in the analysis is constrained by the set of remaining globally observable actions. For instance, the properties that are available for reasoning in the analysis of the GasStation can only be formed by actions Prepay1 and Prepay2. Safety properties that involve other actions cannot be examined from the global LTS of the GasStation in Figure 11 . Examples of these other properties are that the Operator must give the right change to the right customer (Figure 12(a) ) and the Pump must complete the service to a customer before serving the other ( Figure  12(b) ). The former property refers to the expected behavior of Operator and the latter to that of Pump. If these properties are to be verified in the CRA, actions charge1, charge2, change1, change2, start1, start2, finish1 , and finish2 need to be made globally observable. However, this would offend against the hiding principle of CRA techniques and thus undermine the effectiveness of the associated analysis. In the following, we introduce a technique that is capable of checking these safety properties without increasing the set of globally observable actions in the GasStation.
Validation of Safety Properties
A safety property prescribes the set of legitimate traces. This can be represented by a deterministic property automaton T ϭ ͑S, A, ⌬, q͒, which 
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• is free of state and internal action (see Figure 12) . A property is said to be violated, within the context of a distributed program, when some processes can perform a trace not acceptable to the property automaton. The detection mechanism is required to make the violation, if any, globally observable. To achieve this, we first derive an LTS, referred to as an image automaton, based on a given property automaton. The image automaton traps possible violation at the state. This image automaton is then composed with the processes to which the automaton applies. As the state is preserved by both the restriction operator and the composition operator, possible violation is made globally observable. Violation of safety properties can therefore be checked by examining the existence of the state in the global LTS.
An image automaton TЈ ϭ ͑S ഫ ͕͖, A, ⌬Ј, q͒ can be derived from a given property automaton T ϭ ͑S, A, ⌬, q͒ by defining ⌬Ј to be ⌬ ഫ ͕͑s, a, ͒͑s, a͒ ʦ S ϫ A ∧ ? / sЈ ʦ S : ͑s, a, sЈ͒ ʦ ⌬͖.
For example,
(1) T and TЈ have the same set of nontrapping traces (i.e., tr͑T͒) and (2) for any process P, PʈTЈ does not contain trapping traces if and only if tr͑P1␣T͒ ʕ tr͑T͒.
PROOF OF CONDITION (1).
Step (1) in the construction of an image automaton ensures that ⌬ is a subset of ⌬Ј.
Step (2) ensures that for any transition ͑s, a, sЈ͒ belongs to ⌬Ј Ϫ ⌬, sЈ equals . Hence, ⌬Ј and ⌬ contain the same set of transitions that do not involve state , i.e., ͕͑s, a, sЈ͒͑s, a, sЈ͒ ʦ ⌬Ј ∧ sЈ ͖ ϭ ͕͑s, a, sЈ͒͑s, a, sЈ͒ ʦ ⌬Ј ∧ s ͖.
Since T and TЈ share the same initial state q, all nontrapping traces that can be performed by T can also be performed by TЈ and vice versa. As a result, T and TЈ have the same set of nontrapping traces, which is equal to tr͑T͒. e
PROOF OF CONDITION (2).
Case (1): If Part. Assume tr͑P1␣T͒ ʕ tr͑T͒. tr͑͑PʈT͒1␣T͒ equals ͕tt ʦ tr͑P1␣TЈ͒ പ tr͑TЈ͖͒ which in turn equals ͕tt ʦ tr͑P1␣T͒ പ tr͑T͖͒ ഫ ͕tt ʦ tr͑P1␣T͒ പ ͑tr͑TЈ͒ Ϫ tr͑T͖͒͒. The image process TЈ is so constructed that only those traces in tr͑TЈ͒ Ϫ tr͑T͒ can lead TЈ in a trap state. Hence, ͕tt ʦ tr͑P1␣T͒ പ tr͑T͖͒ and ͕tt ʦ tr͑P1␣T͒ പ ͑tr͑TЈ͒ Ϫ tr͑T͖͒͒ represent the set of nontrapping and trapping traces respectively in ͑PʈT͒1␣T. As tr͑P1␣T͒ ʕ tr͑T͒, tr͑P1␣T͒ പ ͑tr͑TЈ͒ Ϫ tr͑T͒͒ is an empty set. As a result, there are no trapping traces in ͑PʈT͒1␣T, ͑PʈT͒1␣T is nontrappable. Thus, PʈTЈ is also nontrappable.
Case (2): Only-If Part. Assume PʈTЈ is nontrappable. Let us suppose tr͑P1␣T͒
tr͑T͒. This implies that P1␣T can perform a trace t that does not belong to tr͑T͒. We note that any prefix of t can be performed by P1␣T. Let s be a prefix of t such that T can perform all prefixes of s but not the s itself. By the method we construct the image process, s can also be performed by TЈ. As a result, s is in a trapping trace in TЈ. Thus s is a trapping trace in ͑P1␣TʈTЈ͒, which is equal to ͑PʈT͒1␣T. By the semantics of the restriction operator, the existence of a trapping trace in ͑PʈT͒1␣T implies the existence of a trapping trace in PʈTЈ. This contradicts the assumption that PʈTЈ is nontrappable. Thus, the supposition cannot hold. e Condition (2) enables us to detect violation of safety properties in a system, by checking the existence of trapping traces in the composite process formed by the system and the image automata. If trapping traces exist in the composite process, some safety properties are violated.
In CRA, an image automaton can be composed directly with a constituent process whose alphabet is a superset of that of the automaton. For example, Figure 14 shows the modified subsystem hierarchy to include the image automata of Figure 13 . As shown in the modified hierarchy, Right_ChangeЈ and Right_ServiceЈ are composed (in parallel) respectively with the processes Operator and Pump to which these properties refer. An image automaton is placed within the subsystem whose propety is to be examined. For instance, the image automaton Right_ChangeЈ is placed within Counter, as it concerns the actions ͕charge1, charge2, change1, change2͖ in which the components of Counter participate. Figure 15 gives the global LTS derived by the CRA, based on the hierarchy in Figure 14 . Since the global LTS contains trapping traces, the gas station 
Compositional Reachability Analysis
• system does not satisfy both safety properties represented by the property automata Right_Change and Right_Service.
DEBUGGING
Locating the Violation
The above technique indicates whether all specified safety properties are satisfied. However, users would normally wish to know which particular safety properties are violated, and in what way. To provide this information, the CRA technique needs to be further enhanced with a mechanism to keep track of the relation between those transitions leading to the trap state in the global LTS and those in the image automata.
Let P be a process ͗S, A, ⌬, q͘, and p be a mapping ͑͑S Ϫ ͕͖͒ ϫ A͒ 3 2 ͑͑ℑϪ͑͒͒ϫ⌺ϫ͕͖͒ , where ℑ and ⌺ denote the universal sets of states and actions, respectively. The value of p ͑s, a͒ indicates the set of trapping transitions in the image automata that contribute to a trapping transition ͑s, a, ͒ in P. Let s denote the process ͗S, A, ⌬, q͘, where s is a reachable state in P. The mapping p is defined as follows:
(1) if P is a primitive LTS, p ͑s, a͒ ϭ ͕͑s, a, ͖͒ if ͑s, a, ͒ exists in P, otherwise A; Since the set union operation can be computed using bitwise arithmetic in imperative programming languages, its computational complexity is linear in time and space. The computation of does not increase the computational complexity of the error detection mechanism.
Using the above definition, ͑ Right_ChangeЈ , charge1͒ and Right_ChangeЈ ͑0 Right_ChangeЈ , change1͒ are defined to be A and ͕͑0 Right_ChangeЈ , change1, ͖͒, respectively. Here, 0 Right_ChangeЈ represents the state 0 in the image automaton Right_ChangeЈ. Applying the definition to processes constructed by CRA, GasStation ͑2 GasStation , ͒ takes a value of ͕͑1 RightϪChangeЈ , change2, ͖͒, ͕͑2 RightϪChangeЈ , change1, ͖͒. The global LTS of GasStation constructed based on the hierarchy of Figure 14 is given in Figure 15 . It contains only one trapping transition ͑2 GasStation , , ͒. The value of GasStation ͑2 GasStation , ͒ suggests that the safety violation occurs at transitions ͑1 RightϪChangeЈ , change2, ͒ and ͑2 RightϪChangeЈ , change1, ͒ of the image automata Right_ChangeЈ (Figure 13(a) ). The former represents a situation where charge1 can be followed by change2, and the latter represents a situation where charge2 can be followed by change1. In both situations, customers receive the wrong change. On the other hand, the safety property specified by property automaton Right_Service (Figure 12(b) ) is not violated by the GasStation.
Construction of Debugging Traces
A common error reporting in behavioral analysis is to present a debugging trace that leads the system being analyzed to a trap state. Users may then follow the given trace to gain a deeper understanding of the reported errors. While the analysis of large systems is better done incrementally with details suppressed at intermediate stages, information provided by debugging traces should be as detailed as possible. A debugging trace should show explicitly how each primitive process of a system reaches a state where a desirable property is violated. Thus, a debugging trace of the GasStation system may include unobservable actions performed by Station, Clients, Pump, and Counter. An example leading to the violation of Right_Change is ͗prepay1, pump_avail, activate, start1, finish1, charge2, change1͘. Unobservable actions in a trace can be recovered using the following reconstruction algorithm proposed by Yeh and Young [1993] . The algorithm (Figure 16 ) assumes the availability of a global trace routine gtrace which, given a list of processes and a trace of observable actions as input, returns a detailed sequence of moves. A move is a (sources, actions) pair containing the action(s) taken in the move and the originating process(es) of the action(s). The algorithm successively reconstructs unobservable actions in a trace according to the subsystem hierarchy deployed for compositional analysis. The predicate primitive checks if a given process is primitive. The routine actions_to_moves converts a list of actions into a list of moves by adding the source information; project extracts actions of a particular process; and compact removes invisible internal actions. The
Compositional Reachability Analysis • routine reconstruct aggregates individual moves exhibited by each child at a lower level into a single list of moves.
Regression Checking by Restructuring
Debugging facilities of an analysis tool should ideally go beyond the generation of debugging traces. Facilities should be provided to reduce the effort in fixing errors and reanalysis. To fix a reported error, designers may modify the specification of some processes, based on the analysis results and their intuition/preferences. For instance, the designer of the GasStation system may choose to modify the Pump to try and fix the violation of Right_Change. At the same time, the modified system should continue to satisfy the other desirable property Right_Service. To ensure this, the system needs to be checked again each time that it has been modified. We refer to this as regression checking, since debugging is likely to be a trial-and-error exercise. For instance, the Pump specification may be modified many times before the error is actually fixed. The effort of regression checking could contribute to a significant part of the software development cost. This effort can, to some extent, be relieved by the use of compositional analysis, where only those subsystems affected by a change need be checked again. For example in Figure 17 , only subsystems N0, N1, N5 need be reconstructed in the subsystem hierarchy when the primitive processes colored in black are modified. However the effort of regression checking may still be expensive for large systems where modifications are less localized and where many subsystems are affected.
A more effective approach is to avoid regression checking of subsystems wherever possible. To achieve this, we need to restructure the subsystem hierarchy and construct a minimized, composite LTS for all processes in the system other than the subsystem being modified. The restructuring algorithm is presented in Figure 18 . The restructure algorithm takes Vc, the processes to be modified, and a tree ͑V, E͒ that records the original subsystem hierarchy, where Vand E represent the vertices and edges, respectively. Upon termination, it returns a restructured hierarchy recorded as ͑VЈ, EЈ͒. Statements 1 and 2 insert a new root vЈ o in ͑VЈ, EЈ͒. The new root vЈ o is then made to be a node that links directly to v o and those modified primitive processes in V c . Afterward, the old root v o is made to be a subsystem that holds all processes in the system other than those in V c . The function sibling ͑V, E͒ ͑V c ͒ returns a set of processes in ͑V, E͒ that share the same immediate parents as those in V c . As these sibling processes are placed under the same immediate subsystems with those being modified, they are likely to have close interaction with each other. As such, sibling processes are better placed as near as 
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• possible to the modified ones. This is achieved by putting these sibling processes directly under the old root v o . The function parent ͑V, E͒ ͑V c ͒ returns a set of immediate parents of vertices in V c . With all immediate successors having been relinked, these parent nodes can be removed from the tree. Note that the algorithm may also be applied to cases where primitive processes are scattered in the subsystem hierarchy and are embedded in more than one immediate subsystem.
The Mechanism of Regression Checking
We need to confirm that the restructuring process preserves the safety properties of the original systems. In the restructured hierarchy, internal actions that involve only process interactions within a subsystem are hidden at its boundary. Since the restructured hierarchy is different from the original one, the set of actions restricted by each subsystem may differ before and after restructuring. Suppose the program behaves as S and SЈ before and after restructuring, respectively. SЈ is weakly equivalent to P1L, where P is the state machine directly composed from the primitive processes of the program and where L is the set of actions that appear in S. Thus SЈ preserves the safety properties of P. As S is again weakly equivalent to P1L where L is the set of actions appear in S, SЈ preserves the safety properties of S.
Using the restructuring algorithm, the hierarchy in Figure 17 is transformed to that in Figure 19 for regression checking. In the first round of regression checking, the number of subsystems that need to be reconstructed in the restructured hierarchy is no more than that required in the original hierarchy. The effort of regression checking is significantly reduced in subsequent attempts becaue only the LTS of the new root N0Ј needs to be reconstructed regardless of the tree size and structure. The approach of 
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• S. C. Cheung and J. Kramer regression checking using restructuring is particularly useful if the changes affect many subsystems.
Clearly, this restructuring approach does not necessarily work if subsystems are constructed using conventional CRA, without the inclusion of trapping states. This is because the composite LTS constructed may only check properties involving actions at the interface of the modified subsystem ]. To illustrate the point, let us consider the gas control system as an example and suppose that Pump is the primitive process to be modified. The property Right_Change which involves actions not belonging to the interface of Pump cannot be checked using a restructured hierarchy. As a result, the enhanced CRA technique needs to be employed for regression checking. The inclusion of the state allows the satisfiability conditions of subsystem properties to be propagated up a subsystem hierarchy even though these properties may involve hidden actions. These properties are satisfied if and only if the LTS constructed for the root in the subsystem hierarchy is nontrappable. In the restructuring algorithm, property automata are treated, as primitive processes not to be modified.
Regression Checking of the Gas Control System
Suppose Pump is the process selected to be modified to eradicate the reported error. Using the restructuring algorithm, one can derive a subsystem hierarchy as shown in Figure 20 for regression checking from that given in Figure 14 . The composite LTS Counter&Clients is constructed in the first round of regression checking and is minimized by hiding all actions not involved in the interaction with Pump. After minimization, it consists of 48 states and 103 transitions. Subsequent rounds of regression checking can be conducted in one step by composing the LTS of Counter&Clients and that of the modified Pump is nontrappable, one can conclude the satisfaction of both properties Right_Change and Right_Ser-vice. This is the case if the specification of Pump in Figure 10 is modified to that shown in Figure 21 . In fact, the GasStationЈ formed by composing the Fig. 20 . A restructured subsystem hierarchy of the gas control station for regression checking.
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• Counter&Clients and the Pump was found to behave like the Pump itself. Figure 22 gives the global LTS based on the subsystem hierarchy in Figure  14 after modification.
Correctness of the Global LTS
In previous work [Cheung and Kramer 1993] , it was shown that the overall behavior of a system Z remains unchanged after the parallel composition with a process Ifc if Z and Ifc satisfy the three criteria in an interface theorem (Figure 23 ). Let Z1L be a target system and Ifc be an image automaton specified by users. Using the construction mechanism for image automata ensures that Ifc and Z satisfy criteria (1) and (3) in the theorem. In addiiton, it also ensures that ZʈIfc does not contain trapping traces if and only if tr͑Z1␣Ifc͒ ʕ tr͑Ifc͒. As a result, the absence of reachable trap state in the global LTS of ZʈIfc implies tr͑Z1␣Ifc͒ ʕ tr͑Ifc͒, the satisfaction of criteria (2) in the theorem. Thus a global LTS derived with the inclusion of Ifc represents the overall behavior of Z if the LTS is free from trapping traces. 4 For instance, Figure 22 gives the global LTS constructed with the inclusion of Right_ServiceЈ and Right_ChangeЈ. Since the LTS does not contain any trapping traces, it represents the overall behavior of GasStation that satisfies both properties.
Early Detection of Infeasible Fixes
There is an additional benefit in performing restructuring. Designers may confirm at an early stage if the set of selected processes can be modified to fix the reported errors. For instance, designers may wish to know if 4 The use of strong equivalence in the interface theorem allows its utilization for all equivalences that are supersets of the strong equivalence. As weak equivalence is a superset of strong equivalence (cf. Milner [1989] ) the interface theorem is valid for weak equivalence adopted in the modified CRA. 
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• modification of the selected processes alone could not help fix the errors. This can be confirmed if the composite LTS formed by the other processes in the system and the property automata after restructuring contains a trapping trace involving only actions. For example, violation of the safety property cannot be fixed by modifying the behavior of Pump alone if the composite process Counter&Clients contains a transition leading to from the initial state. No matter how the designers modify the selected process Pump, the trapping tracer remains in the global LTS.
PERFORMANCE
A prototype tool based on the concepts of violation and localization of safety properties has been implemented on the Solaris platform [Giannakopoulou et al. 1999] . We have applied it to check both the faulty and correct versions of the gas station system against the properties Right_Service and Right_Change. The performance results of the tool when applied to the faulty and correct versions are given in Figures 24 and 25 , respectively. The experiments were conducted on a Sparc Ultra/2 server. Three experiments were performed for each number of customers. The first experiment constructs a global LTS which involves only actions start i and finish i for checking the property. The construction was based on the original subsystem hierarchy in Figure 8 . Actions are restricted to each subsystem if they do not participate further in the construction of the global LTS. The result is shown in the column CRA RightϪService . Similarly, in a second experiment we constructed a global LTS which involved only actions charge i and change 1 . Its result is shown in the column CRA RightϪChange . In a third experiment, we applied the proposed enhanced CRA technique and constructed a global LTS consisting of the state and action prepay i . The computational time (in seconds) required in each experiment is given in the associated column t i . The column ⌺ Sbefore gives the summation of the number of states in all intermediate subsystems constructed in each experiment. The summation is based on the number of states of each subsystem before minimization. Compositional Reachability Analysis
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In these experiments, the computational effort required by the enhanced CRA to check both properties is comparable to that taken for checking a single property. The enhanced CRA technique has an additional advantage that the global LTS involving only actions prepay i can be readily obtained if no property violation is identified. The experiments were made possible with the addition of two optimizations in the mechanism of CRA. First, a subsystem is not minimized if it hides no action. Second, the global LTS is not minimized because this is not required for checking safety properties. Since a major fraction of the value in ⌺ Sbefore column is contributed by the Clients subsystem which hides no action, the state minimization algorithm need only be applied to a small portion of the states constructed. Otherwise, the experiments for seven and eight customers would consume much more computational time. A possible way to further reduce the computational costs is to combine the enhanced CRA technique with various state space reduction mechanisms, such as those proposed by Godefroid [1990] and the previous work of Cheung and Kramer [1993] .
To further study the potential of the enhanced CRA, we have applied it to check 21 safety properties in a nontrivial production cell system [Lewerentz and Lindner 1995] . The production cell system was used as one of the major [Broy and Jahnichen 1993] to demonstrate the applicability of formal methods for industrial-scale systems. A production cell, as shown in Figure 26 , forms a basic unit of a real metal-processing plant in Karlsruhe, Germany. Each cell consists of two conveyor belts, a rotary table, a two-armed robot, a press and a traveling crane. When a new blank enters a production cell, it is brought to a rotary table by a feed belt. A two-armed robot moves the blank from the table to a press through robot arm 1 and later moves the forged blank from the press to a deposit belt through robot arm 2. The deposit belt then conveys the forged blank to a position to be moved out of the cell by a traveling crane.
A list of safety properties was identified in the production cell system [Lewerentz and Lindner 1995] . These properties were considered to be the most critical and important requirements amongst all others of the controlling software. In our experiment, the behavior of a production cell was modeled using an eight-layered subsystem hierarchy made up of 19 composite and 29 primitive processes. The safety properties are modeled using 23 property automata. The computational effort taken to check the satisfaction of these properties by the production cell system is shown in Figure 27 . Some properties are modeled using more than one property automaton, such as Propeties 2, 8, and 9. The nature of each property is briefly annotated in the first column of the table. Experiments were conducted on a Sparc Ultra/1 workstation. Full details of the whole case study are available in Cheung [1998] .
The column t 1 shows the computational time taken to construct a global LTS revealing only those actions participating in the corresponding property. The column ⌺ Sbefore shows the summation of the number of states in the subsystems constructed by CRA before their minimization. The column t 2 gives the computational time taken to check a given property of a sub- Compositional Reachability Analysis • system after incorporating as its component the associated property. The computation stops when all subsystems to be constructed are made up of only nontrappable components, in which case the prescribed property has been satisfied. All properties, except property 17, are local to some composite processes in the subsystem hierarchy. The results show that most of the 21 computations can stop at a stage before the global LTS was constructed. This led to a roughly 95% reduction of the total computational effort. Two observations are worth noting from this case study. First, a significant number of safety properties are local to some composite processes. Second, local safety properties may be verified without the generation of a global LTS. This can lead to a significant reduction in computational effort.
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This article presents a mechanism to check safety properties associated with subsystems in the framework of CRA techniques. These safety properties are specified in terms of deterministic finite-state machines, called property automata, which may involve actions that are not globally observable. The property automata are said to be violated if the associated subsystems can perform traces not acceptable to them. An image automaton can be derived from each given property automaton. The image autom- 
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• S. C. Cheung and J. Kramer aton transits to and remains in a special trap state when the associated subsystem performs a trace which is not acceptable to the original property automaton. This can be identified directly from the existence of a reachable state in the global LTS. If the LTS is free from state , it represents the overall behavior of the system with no property violations; otherwise the mechanism indicates which safety properties are violated and how they can occur.
To further explore the potential of the technique, we are hoping to apply it to more complex examples. Further work is needed to provide guidance as to which actions to hide and at which point in the subsystem hierarchy to compose the properties to be checked. This is both a logical decision as to which is the most sensible and an efficiency decision as to which aids the minimization automation. From the efficiency point of view, the effectiveness of compositional analysis depends on the structure of a subsystem hierarchy. The use of context constraints in Cheung and Kramer [1993; can help to alleviate this problem. These constraints capture behavioral restriction imposed on subsystems by their neighboring processes. This permits the design of a subsystem hierarchy to be based more on logical than efficiency criteria. Supporting analysis tools [Giannakopoulou et al. 1999] have been implemented, and we are proposing to incorporate these into an environment for the design and construction of distributed programs, the System Architect's Assistant [Ng et al. 1996] which utilizes the Darwin language [Magee et al. 1994] for the specification of the software architectures. Finally we are investigating an approach for the specification and checking of liveness properties [Cheung et al. 1997 ] which would complement the enhanced CRA approach for safety properties described in this article.
